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Restoration Problems – Studies to Begin at a Later Date

I wanted to share a recent response to an inquiry I was provided CIC and why I think it creates unreasonableness – call it reasonableness in the unreasonableness.

Here is the scenario. For whatever reason, your client’s Application for a Post-Graduate Work Permit is refused or never submitted. The client’s study permit has also expired. The 90-day after meeting graduation requirement period in which to apply for a Post-Graduate Work Permit has also lapsed. Restoration is the only option. The restoration date is calculated either 90 days from the expiry of your status (in the event an extension/work permit application was never submitted) or 90 days after you receive a refusal of your application (in the event an extension/work permit application was submitted).

Let us also assume that it is now September. Fall program registration has ended. The program you are interested in starts in the  New Year.

My question was below:

Question:

I have a general question about restoration of student permits for studies to begin at a later date.

Individuals who have their post-graduate work permit (PGWP) applications refused and are no longer eligible for a PGWP due to expired study permits and passage of time have the option to restore their status (in-Canada) as a student on the basis of a student permit extension, which itself is based on a new offer of acceptance.

However if the offer of acceptance is for studies to begin at a later date (i.e. a later semester) is it possible to have a student stay in Canada on a study permit, on deferred enrollment, while not actively pursuing studies for that period of time?

I was unable to find the answer to this on CIC’s available material on study permits and the new study permit rules.

Response:

The determination of whether or not a study permit can be issued for individuals who have applied for a restoration of status with a letter of acceptance for a program expected to commence on a date in the future (e.g. a later semester), rests with the officer assessing the application. It may be determined that a study permit can be issued based on the date the program is expected to commence, or the study permit may be denied because the period of time before the program commences is not considered reasonable. If the study permit is denied the individual must leave Canada and can apply for a study permit at a later date.

The students who have lost their status may also apply for a restoration of status as a visitor. If the restoration of status is approved the individual could remain in Canada, however, they will not be authorized to study, and will still be required to apply for a study permit outside of Canada a later date as per R213.

This is the particular section I have trouble with: “It may be determined that a study permit can be issued based on the date the program is expected to commence, or the study permit may be denied because the period of time before the program commences is not considered reasonable.”

With processing times for a restoration of status frankly “up in the air,” how does one time the restoration application? Without legislative guidance, what does “reasonable mean.” For me, reasonable is three months but for the Officer that may be unreasonable.

It will be interesting to see if there are any refusals from the application of this discretion. Would be fun to challenge this in the Federal Court.

 

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Recent Experiences with PGWP Problems (Updated – 15 September 2016)

One thing I have noticed recently in my practice is the number of individuals who are having challenges with Post-Graduate Work Permits, more specifically the period of time between which they complete their final academic session and the time in which they receive their post-graduate work permit (PGWP).

The period in which an international student holds a PGWP is the most crucial period in their ambition to become a economic permanent resident. As I have discussed in several prior posts, the PGWP provides the student the opportunity (albeit often challenging to obtain) to get the one-year of skilled work experience that can set them up for the Express Entry process.

Problems 1: Late/Mistimed Application

An increasing problem I am seeing is that individuals are applying too late for their post-graduate work permit. A post-graduate work permit must be submitted with 90 days from meeting the requirements of completing the program of study. This DOES NOT always mean (and usually does not mean) the actual date of your graduation. Most programs (and inquiries should be made with your institution if this is not the case) issue letters or notices indicating that you have completed your requirements and are now eligible for graduation. This is the date the clock starts ticking.

For many individuals their study permits may extend beyond the period of their full-time studies. This can also be very deceiving for an individual preparing to apply for a PGWP. Since June 2014, the new study permit requirements have created an oft-confusing provision that allows you to work full-time during regularly scheduled breaks (i.e. summer/winter/spring vacations) as long as you maintain full-time status as a student. Importantly, this DOES NOT cover the summer after you graduate UNLESS you have a pending application for a PGWP.

Right now PGWP Applications (submitted online) are also taking several months. CIC does not specifically post processing times for PGWP but from several individuals, I have heard this has taken up to 4-5 months. If the PGWP Application is made before the study permit expires, this will give the Applicant the ability to work (accordingly to the terms of their study permit, until a decision is made on their PGWP. While this is all good, the waiting period can be particularly challenging on students who had accompanying spouses who had their open work permits tied to the PGWP applicant’s  expiring study permits. There is no implied status for the accompanying spouse and their own ability to receive a further open work permit  will be tied to the PGWP Applicant receiving their PGWP and demonstrating their employment in a NOC 0, A, B position.

Resultantly, Individuals who have the ability to apply for a work permit at the port of entry and/or flagpole are strongly advised to look into the option and seek advise from competent counsel prior to attempting to make the application. The process, if done properly, could save several months of worry. I recommend reading my colleague Steven Meurren’s excellent piece on flagpoling and its potential risks here.

Problem 2: Poorly-Prepared Application

The challenge with PGWP is that they are a “one shot deal.” Whereas a refusal for a temporary-resident visa or initial study permit can often be addressed through a new application, which may cost an Applicant a few months or a semester of wait time, a failed PGWP Application can possibly alter by several years, a potential foreign students plans in Canada.

For example,  let us assume an Applicant is informed in May 2016 that their program is completed. That Applicant  duly submits an online Application for a PGWP right away. Their study permit expires in July. Should they receive a refusal in September 2016, they will now be out of the range to apply for a PGWP (more than 90 days). Furthermore, they will be ineligible as they no longer hold a valid study permit. The Applicant’s restoration of temporary resident status would only be possible on the basis of a study permit extension (which will require a new acceptance) or switching to visitor status.

Again, I think this is a major gap/flaw in the way the PGWP program currently operates but it gives way to possible strategies (that I have not yet myself explored) that may be employed to try and mitigate the situation.  The way the rules currently operate, I am advising most of my clients to have a “back up plan” ready (i.e. further studies or other work permit options) in the event something goes array with the PGWP Application.

Please note the recent decision in Nookala v. Canada (MCI) 2016 FC 1019  where Madam Justice Mactavish explicitly rejects the strategy of restoring to a study permit for the purposes of obtaining a new post-graduate work permit where no program of study has been entered into at the time of restoration.

Generally speaking the PGWP Application is quite straight forward, and CIC does give further information requests to facilitate this process. However, I can certainly foresee with the new study permit regulation’s greater scrutiny of work and study during the validity of study permits, more PGWP refusals down the road. PGWP Applicants would be wise do double and triple check that all fees, documents, and especially dates before submitting their Application.

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Dual Intention: FC in Jewell Reinforces That it is More than a Buzzword

Dual Intent

Introduction

As many of you might know, our Firm recently won an important Federal Court case relating to dual intent, a much maligned but rarely addressed legal concept in our Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“IRPA”).

I want to discuss a few of the principles of the case, but equally important walk through some of the lessons I learned through this case, my first start-to-finish Judicial Review as an Articling Student.

Dual Intention Is Not Dead

Prior to this case, I remember quite clearly several discussions between lawyers on the Canada Bar Association’s Canadian Immigration Email Listserv, asking the question:

Is Dual Intention Dead?

I think Justice O’Reilly, who it is to be noted has allowed judicial review in quite a few of the recent cases he has heard, came out with an emphatic “no” in his recently released decision in Jewell v. Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) 2015 FC 1046. 

To recap, Mr. Jewell was an American-Citizen who had a Canadian-born girlfriend. There were text messages on his phone that were recovered by CBSA Officer through a cellphone search that made the Officer believe Mr. Jewell had established permanent residency in Canada without having obtained permanent resident status purportedly contrary to s.20(1)(a) of IRPA. The Officer and Minister’s Delegate, in their interviews of Mr. Jewell, looked at his pattern of travel over a two week period, and determined that it was consistent with a Canadian permanent resident, commuting to the U.S. for work, resetting his temporary status through his frequent trips. The terminology they used (although not specifically cited in the decision) was that Mr. Jewell was “abusing the privilege of his six-month visitor visa exemption.”

As soon as the case came through the door, something smelled fishy to me. How can any an officer determine over a two week period whether someone had established permanent residence? Why was the physical residence in Canada a trigger point? Aren’t there arguably many temporary residents in Canada (students, workers, visitors alike) who live in Canada and have houses here. We early on isolated, dual intent as the battleground in this case.

From a litigation standpoint, one of the more interesting parts of this case came, after leave was granted, when we learned that a recent dual intent case had been dismissed by the Federal Court in Barua v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 FC 172. In Barua, the Federal Court completely dismissed the applicant’s dual intent argument concluding that Mr. Barua had several attempts to establish his dual intent and simply did not not demonstrate that he would leave when required. I remember when preparing our further memorandum that there would be no way Barua would not be cited by DOJ (Minister’s counsel) and made the conscious decision that we would approach and address that case preemptively.

However, an the case carefully I realized there were several factual nuances. Mr. Barua had previously arrived in Canada under false pretenses of having a work permit, but no real job opportunity at the time. He also was counselled several times to apply for permanent residency and ultimately told Officer’s he could not leave and would not leave Canada.

What initially was going to be a dagger blow, turned out to be a blessing in disguise. We were able to clearly draw a line in the sand between the cases DOJ were relying on – all individuals who had long-term patterns, non-compliance, and multiple opportunities to establish their dual intention and Mr. Jewell, who really was not offered even one opportunity to state his dual intention or have his dual intention adequately assessed.

Justice O’Reilly’s decision in our case is a short one. In fact, he managed to summarize in four paragraphs what 20 pages of our Final Memorandum emphasized. I wanted to present those four key paragraphs, as they are quite important to my assessment of the implications of this case:

III.             Was the delegate’s decision unreasonable?

[11]           The Minister submits that the exclusion order was reasonable because Mr Jewella dmitted his intention to reside in Canada permanently. Further, Mr Jewell was behaving as a permanent resident of Canada by commuting from BC to Washington.

[12]           I disagree with the Minister’s position. In my view, the delegate failed to assess Mr. Jewell’s dual intention to be a temporary resident at present, and to become a permanent resident later.

[13]           IRPA provides that foreign nationals may hold the intention to become permanent residents without being precluded from becoming temporary residents if they show they will leave Canada at the end of their authorized period of residence (s 22(2)). If they cannot do so, an exclusion order will be considered reasonable (Barua v Canada (Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2015 FC 172 at para 22; Sibomana v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 853 at paras 27-28).

[14]           The evidence before the delegate did not show that Mr Jewell intended to become a permanent resident of Canada without abiding by the applicable rules. At best, the evidence was ambiguous. Further, there is no evidence that Mr Jewell would refuse to leave Canada, or that he would fail to observe any other legal requirements.

[15]           Therefore, in my view, the delegate’s decision did not represent a defensible outcome based on the facts and the law. It was unreasonable.

Implications

While arguably that this case is too fact dependent and the reasoning too short to be considered a strong precedent, I think Jewell does bear some weight for future temporary residents trying to come to Canada with an eye to permanent residency.

From having looked at the case law, Jewell is one of the first decisions that really tackles this issues for an individual who does not yet have an application in processing. Prior to Jewell dual intention was commonly considered only available for those who had access to a readily available permanent residence option or more often had a sponsorship application in process and wanted a Temporary Resident Visa to visit in the interim.

With Jewell, I can see more challenges to cases where evidence such as cellphone records or bag searches turn up evidence which suggests lives are being packed in preparation for immigration. The case suggests it is not enough to simply look at private text messages between couples saying “I am moving to Canada” or look at whether an individual is shipping his household furniture to Canada.

Jewell suggests that at the very least a dual intention analysis needs to be carried out by the Officer. I would assume that such a process should be done pursuant to CIC’s explicit instructions on the issue. Importantly, as stated in the instructions:

Officers are reminded to use their own judgment and the flexibility afforded to them by A22(2) when making decisions in cases with a dual intent aspect. CAIPS/FOSS/GCMS notes should clearly demonstrate the officer’s reasoning when assessing a case.

In Mr. Jewell’s case, while there  may have been some assessment of where he lived and what he had been texting to his girlfriend, there was ultimately no assessment of dual intention or if Jewell would leave Canada and abide by the rules and regulations.

Possible Mitigation Strategy

I do not see “dual intention” being a magic incantation that an individual can simply recite at the Port of Entry. An individual who’s travel history clearly demonstrates that they have no intention and/or means to establish legal permanent resident status but are still trying to come in as long-term repeat temporary residents (i.e. through frequent flagpoles) will increase their risk of having their dual intention requests denied.

On this note, obtaining a visitor record may assist in establishing dual intention and facilitating entry (particularly for cross-border couples).

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Nuance in Federal Court’s ruling in Guerrero should be explored

IMG_20150922_121750

Introduction

My mentor and colleague Steve often tells me when I go on and on about having found the “perfect precedent” for my case that in the realm of the Federal Court such a term is not so easily contrived and applied.

The fact specific nature of immigration inquiries combined with the cautious nature of many judgments written by the Bench that emphasis this, make it often difficult to establish precedent. The standards of review (reasonableness and correctness) themselves open up a certain level of discretion. What may be reasonable in one circumstance can become unreasonable in another. What is procedurally fair in one circumstance can be unfair in another.

More often than not using Federal Court case law (in the context of Federal Court) becomes the task of not arguing whether legal principles are right or wrong but taking your client’s case, case law in support, and case law not in support, and sussing out the factual nuances.

Certifying a question, the only way by which the case can go to the Court of Appeal and eventually to the Supreme Court of Canada is becoming more and more difficult.  You are more frequently seeing Federal Court judges rule this way: (example taken from Steve’s recent win in Federal Court in Gupta v. Canada  (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness) 2015 FC 1086).

[26]           The respondent takes the position that this matter is too fact-specific to merit certification of a serious question of general importance. At the respondent’s suggestion, I will not certify a question.

That being said, there is a recent case of  cautious judicial writing but one that makes what amounts to quite a strong criticism of some of the elements of the CIC’s current practice if sending admissibility procedural fairness letters.

For those that are new to the term, procedural fairness letters are the letters CIC sends when there is further information they need or further submission they require you to make in order to dispel them of their concerns. In some application contexts, failure to submit an adequate response will lead to applications being thrown out. In other contexts, such as inadmissibility, the consequences will be more sever as an s.44 inadmissibility report may be written up on your client.

For immigration lawyers/practitioners, it represents the first (and possibly last) opportunity we will have to effectively represent the client before any litigation (i.e. Federal Court and Immigration Appeal Division in some cases) where the onus shifts quite drastically to the Applicant to prove his or her case.

Guerrero v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2015 FC 1086

The Guerrero case is a very interesting one for the situation is not an uncommon one but the consequences are quite severe. In fact, in our office we have done a few consultations on related situations.

To sum it up briefly (as you can read the entire case: here), Mr. Guerrero applied for permanent residency through the Federal Skilled Worker program in 2010 and added his wife, Merambel, after marriage in 2013. During his interview  at the Port of Entry and prior to finalization of the PR application, it came to light that Guerrero had had an affair with a lady named Martinez (a coworker). He made some statements at the Port of Entry during his interview, that formed the basis of Officer’s notes.

Based on CIC’s concern about the relationship, a procedural fairness letter sent referencing misrepresentation and the bona fides of the relationship. In response, Mr. Guerrero sent statutory declarations and provided evidence of his relationship.

Finally a decision was issued, finding that he had misrepresented himself in statements he made at the port of entry as they contradicted with his written statements in response to the procedural fairness letter.

Justice Southcott’s decision in Guerrero turned on an analysis of procedural fairness and whether the failure to provide the Applicant a fair opportunity to contradict or corrective statements amounted to a breach of procedural fairness.

Justice Southcott’s decision, I found, very clearly distinguished between situations where the applicant themselves provides information versus the use of extrinsic information that the applicant is unaware of (para 28 of that decision).

The nuance here is that Justice Southcott found that the officer’s port of entry notes, containing statements purported to have been made by Guerrero and Martinez, was not considered evidence that Mr. Guerrero should have been aware of. Justice Southcott writes (emphasis added):

[31]           The challenge for the Respondent in advancing this position is the fact that, prior to production of the Certified Tribunal Record as part of this judicial review application process, the Applicants had never seen, reviewed or approved these notes. The notes are therefore different from a written statement or other documentary evidence submitted by an applicant and different from someone else’s record of what an applicant has said where the applicant was provided an opportunity to review such record. In my view, in the absence of such an opportunity, depending on the use of the record, the duty of procedural fairness may be engaged so that the impugned individual is not deprived of the opportunity to raise concerns about whether the statements were recorded accurately.

Interestingly, Justice Southcott went into an even more nuanced analysis by looking at the specific language of the procedural fairness letter and whether it provided the Applicant with the required opportunity to respond. He concluded that the letter (emphasis added):

does not set out the detail of the statements, purported to have previously been made by Guerrero and Martinez as reflected in the port of entry notes, on which the Officer’s concerns were based. Guerrero’s affidavit, filed in support of this judicial review application, states that he advised the CBSA officers in November 2013 that his relationship with Martinez came to an end in April 2013 when he married Merambel and that he never stated that he would end the relationship when his wife came to Canada.”

Finally, and again consistent with what I was discussing earlier, Justice Southcott applies judicial caution in explicitly suggesting that this case was fact specific and that he was not suggesting a general requirement for the provision of Officer’s notes (usually obtained by counsel at ATIP but sometimes only received at the CTR stage). He writes (emphasis added):

[40]           I am conscious of the Respondent’s point that it is not common practice to provide port of entry notes in circumstances such as these as part of the duty of procedural fairness. I am not suggesting that there should be a general obligation to do so. Rather, my conclusion is that, in the specific circumstances of this case, given the particular use that was made of such notes by the Officer in making the Decision, the content of the procedural fairness letter did not contain sufficient detail to satisfy the duty of fairness. My finding is that the Officer’s approach to the discharge of that duty was accordingly incorrect and, if I were to afford some degree of deference to the manner in which the Officer approached that duty, I would also conclude such approach to be unreasonable.

Why I Hope This Case Gets Emphasized More By Counsel

Even in light of all of Justice Southcott’s cautious reasoning, I think his analysis does raise a very real challenge to the status quo of broad procedural fairness letters.

For example, in one of the recent cases we worked on in this office relating to criminal inadmissibility, we were quite sure the tactic of CBSA was to pass the ball to us first rather than to have them weigh through the thousand pages of evidence. The procedural fairness letter was very broad and did not even specify what criminal code provision our client was being found to have ‘committed’ an equivalent offense under.

While perhaps most relevant in the inadmissibility context, where the consequences on the applicants are very severe, I could see this principle applied to all types of economic and family immigration cases. Many procedural fairness letters that are sent are standard-form, and certainly much less detailed than the ones the Guerrero’s were afforded.

While the practice of counsel ATIPing to get the ‘cards held by CIC/CBSA’ will continue, it does suggest that our immigration officials need to be more thorough in laying out their claims before sending the letters.

 

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Will Tao is an Award-Winning Canadian Immigration and Refugee Lawyer, Writer, and Policy Advisor based in Vancouver. Vancouver Immigration Blog is a public legal resource and social commentary.

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