Human-in-the loop

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The DADM’s Noticeable Silence: Clarifying the Human Role in the Canadian Government’s Hybrid Decision-Making Systems [Law 432.D – Op-Ed 2]

This is part 2 of a two-part series sharing Op-Eds I wrote for my Law 432.D course titled “Accountable Computer Systems.” This blog will likely go up on the course website in the near future but as I am hoping to speak to and reference things I have written for a presentations coming up, I am sharing here, first. This blog discusses the hot topic of ‘humans in the loop’ for automated decision-making systems [ADM]. As you will see from this Op-Ed, I am quite critical of our current Canadian Government self-regulatory regime’s treatment of this concept.

As a side note, there’s a fantastic new resource called TAG (Tracking Automated Government) that I would suggest those researching this space add to their bookmarks. I found it on X/Twitter through Professor Jennifer Raso’s post. For those that are also more new to the space or coming from it through immigraiton, Jennifer Raso’s research on automated decision-making, particularly in the context of administrative law and frontline decision-makers is exceptional. We are leaning on her research as we develop our own work in the immigration space.

Without further ado, here is the Op-Ed.

The DADM’s Noticeable Silence: Clarifying the Human Role in the Canadian Government’s Hybrid Decision-Making Systems[i]

Who are the humans involved in hybrid automated decision-making (“ADM”)? Are they placed into the system (or loop) to provide justification for the machine’s decisions? Are they there to assume legal liability? Or are they merely there to ensure humans still have a job to do?

Effectively regulating hybrid ADM systems requires an understanding of the various roles played by the humans in the loop and clarity as to the policymaker’s intentions when placing them there. This is the argument made by Rebecca Crootof et al. in their article, “Humans in the Loop” recently published in the Vanderbilt Law Review.[ii]

In this Op-Ed, I discuss the nine roles that humans play in hybrid decision-making loops as identified by Crootof et al. I then turn to my central focus, reviewing Canada’s Directive on Automated Decision-Making (“DADM”)[iii] for its discussion of human intervention and humans in the loop to suggest that Canada’s main Government self-regulatory AI governance tool not only falls short, but supports an approach of silence towards the role of humans in Government ADMs.

 

What is a Hybrid Decision-Making System? What is a Human in the Loop?

A hybrid decision-making system is one where machine and human actors interact to render a decision.[iv]

The oft-used regulatory definition of humans in the loop is “an individual who is involved in a single, particular decision made in conjunction with an algorithm.[v] Hybrid systems are purportedly differentiable from “human off the loop” systems, where the processes are entirely automated and humans have no ability to intervene in the decision.[vi]

Crootof et al. challenges the regulatory definition and understanding, labelling it as misleading as its “focus on individual decision-making obscures the role of humans everywhere in ADMs.”[vii] They suggest instead that machines themselves cannot exist or operate independent from humans and therefore that regulators must take a broader definition and framework for what constitutes a system’s tasks.[viii] Their definition concludes that each human in the loop, embedded in an organization, constitutes a “human in the loop of complex socio-technical systems for regulators to target.”[ix]

In discussing the law of the loop, Crootof et al. expresses the numerous ways in which the law requires, encourages, discourages, and even prohibits humans in the loop. [x]

Crootof et al. then labels the MABA-MABA (Men Are Better At, Machines Are Better At) trap,[xi] a common policymaker position that erroneously assumes the best of both worlds in the division of roles between humans and machines, without consideration how they can also amplify each other’s weaknesses.[xii] Crootof et al. finds that the myopic MABA-MABA “obscures the larger, more important regulatory question animating calls to retain human involvement in decision-making.”

As Crootof et al. summarizes:

“Namely, what do we want humans in the loop to do? If we don’t know what the human is intended to do, it’s impossible to assess whether a human is improving a system’s performance or whether regulation has accomplished its goals by adding a human”[xiii]

 

Crootof et al.’s Nine Roles for Humans in the Loop and Recommendations for Policymakers

Crootof sets out nine, non-exhaustive but illustrative roles for humans in the loop. These roles are: (1) corrective; (2) resilience; (3) justificatory; (4) dignitary; (5) accountability; (6) Stand-In; (7) Friction; (8) Warm-Body; and (9) Interface.[xiv] For ease of summary, they have been briefly described in a table attached as an appendix to this Op-Ed.

Crootof et al. discusses how these nine roles are not mutually exclusive and indeed humans can play many of them at the same time.[xv]

One of Crootof et al.’s three main recommendations is that policymakers should be intentional and clear about what roles the humans in the loop serve.[xvi] In another recommendation they suggest that the context matters with respect to the role’s complexity, the aims of regulators, and the ability to regulate ADMs only when those complex roles are known.[xvii]

Applying this to the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (as it then was[xviii]) [“EU AI Act”], Crootof et al. is critical of how the Act separates the human roles of providers and users, leaving nobody responsible for the human-machine system as a whole.[xix]  Crootof et al. ultimately highlights a core challenge of the EU AI Act and other laws – how to “verify and validate that the human is accomplishing the desired goals” especially in light of the EU AI Act’s vague goals.

Having briefly summarized Crootof et al.’s position, the remainder of this Op-Ed ties together a key Canadian regulatory framework, the DADM’s, silence around this question of the human role that Crootof et al. raises.

 

The Missing Humans in the Loop in the Directive on Automated Decision-Making and Algorithmic Impact Assessment Process

Directive on Automated Decision-Making

Canada’s DADM and its companion tool, the Algorithmic Impact Assessment (“AIA”), are soft-law[xx] policies aimed at ensuring that “automated decision-making systems are deployed in a manner that reduces risks to clients, federal institutions and Canadian Society and leads to more efficient, accurate, and interpretable decision made pursuant to Canadian law.”[xxi]

One of the areas addressed in both the DADM and AIA is that of human intervention in Canadian Government ADMs. The DADM states:[xxii]

Ensuring human intervention

6.3.11

Ensuring that the automated decision system allows for human intervention, when appropriate, as prescribed in Appendix C.

6.3.12

Obtaining the appropriate level of approvals prior to the production of an automated decision system, as prescribed in Appendix C.

Per Appendix C of the DADM, the requirement for a human in the loop depends on the self-assessed impact level scoring system to the AIA by the agency itself. For level 1 and 2 (low and moderate impact)[xxiii] projects, there is no requirement for a human in the loop, let alone any explanation of the human intervention points (see table below extracted from the DADM).

I would argue that to avoid explaining further about human intervention, which would then engage explaining the role of the humans in making the decision, it is easier for the agency to self-assess (score) a project as one of low to moderate impact. The AIA creates limited barriers nor a non-arms length review mechanism to prevent an agency strategically self-scoring a project below the high impact threshold.[xxiv]

Looking at the published AIAs themselves, this concern of the agency being able to avoid discussing the human in the loop appears to play out in practice.[xxv] Of the fifteen published AIAs, fourteen of them are self-declared as moderate impact with only one declared as little-to-no impact. Yet, these AIAs are situated in high-impact areas such as mental health benefits, access to information, and immigration.[xxvi] Each of the AIAs contain the same standard language terminology that a human in the loop is not required.[xxvii]

In the AIA for the Advanced Analytics Triage of Overseas Temporary Resident Visa Applications, for example, IRCC further rationalizes that “All applications are subject to review by an IRCC officer for admissibility and final decision on the application.”[xxviii] This seems to engage that a human officer plays a corrective role, but this not explicitly spelled out. Indeed, it is open to contestation from critics who see the Officer role as more as a rubber-stamp (dignitary) role subject to the influence of automation bias.[xxix]

 

Recommendation: Requiring Policymakers to Disclose and Discuss the Role of the Humans in the Loop

While I have fundamental concerns with the DADM itself lacking any regulatory teeth, lacking the input of public stakeholders through a comment and due process challenge period,[xxx] and driven by efficiency interests,[xxxi] I will set aside those concerns for a tangible recommendation for the current DADM and AIA process.[xxxii]

I would suggest that beyond the question around impact, in all cases of hybrid systems where a human will be involved in ADMs, there needs to be a detailed explanation provided by the policymaker of what roles these humans will play. While I am not naïve to the fact that policymakers will not proactively admit to engaging a “warm body” or “stand-in” human in the loop, it at least starts a shared dialogue and puts some onus on the policymaker to both consider proving, but also disproving a particular role that it may be assigning.

The specific recommendation I have is to require as part of an AIA, a detailed human capital/resources plan that requires the Government agency to identify and explain the roles of the humans in the entire ADM lifecycle, from initiation to completion.

This idea also seems consistent with best practices in our key neighbouring jurisdiction, the United States. On 28 March 2024, a U.S. Presidential Memorandum aimed at Federal Agencies titled […]

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Chinook is AI – IRCC’s Own Policy Playbook Tells Us Why

One of the big debates around Chinook is whether or not it is Artificial Intelligence (“AI”). IRCC’s position has been that Chinook is not AI because there is a human ultimately making decisions.

In this piece, I will show how the engagement of a human in the loop is a red herring, but also how the debate skews the real issue that automation, whether for business function only or to help administer administrative decision, can have adverse impacts – if unchecked by independent review.

The main source of my argument that Chinook is AI is from IRCC itself – the Policy Playbook on Automated Support on Decision-Making 2021. This an internal document, which has been updated yearly, but likely captures the most accurate ‘behind the scenes’ snapshot of where IRCC is heading. More on that in future pieces.

AI’s Definition per IRCC

The first, and most important thing is to start with the definition of Artificial intelligence within the Playbook.

The first thing you will notice is that the Artificial Intelligence is defined so broadly by IRCC, which seems to go against the narrow definition it seems to paint with respect to defining Chinook.

Per IRCC, AI is:

If you think of Chinook dealing with the cognitive problem of attempting to issue bulk refusals – and utilizing computer science (technology) – to apply to learning, problem solving and pattern recognition – it is hard to imagine that a system would even be needed if it weren’t AI.

Emails among IRCC, actively discuss the use of Chinook to monitor approval and refusal rates utilizing “Module 6”

Looking at the Chinook Module’s themselves, Quality Assurance (“QA”) is built in as a module. It is hard to imagine a QA system that looks at refusal and approval rates, and automates processes and is not AI.

As this article points out:

Software QA is typically seen as an expensive necessity for any development team; testing is costly in terms of time, manpower, and money, while still being an imperfect process subject to human error. By introducing artificial intelligence and machine learning into the testing process, we not only expand the scope of what is testable, but also automate much of the testing process itself.

Given the volume of files that IRCC is dealing with, it is unlikely that the QA process relies only on humans and not technology (else why would Chinook be implemented). And if it involves technology and automation (a word that shows up multiple times in the Chinook Manual) to aid the monitoring of a subjective administrative decision – guess what – it is AI.

We also know also that Chinook is underpinned with ways to process data, look at historical approval and refusal rates, and flag risks. It also integrates with Watchtower to review the risk of applicants.

It is important to note that even in the Daponte Affidavit in Ocran that alongside ATIPs is the only information we have about Chinook, the focus has always been on the first five modules. Without knowledge of the true nature of something like Module 7 titled ‘ToolBox’ it is certainly premature to be able to label the whole system as not AI.

 

Difficult to Argue Chinook is Purely Process Automation Given Degree of Judgment Exercised by System in Setting Up Findecs (Final Decisions)

Where IRCC might be trying to carve a distinction is between process automation/digital transformation and automated decision support systems.

One could argue, for example, that most of Chinook is process automation.

For example, the very underpinning of Chinook is it allows for the entire application to be made available to the Officer in one centralized location, without opening the many windows that GCMS required. Data-points and fields auto populate from an application and GCMS into a Chinook Software, allowing the Officer to render decisions easier. We get this. It is not debatable.

But does it cross into automated decision support system? Is there some degree of judgment that needs to be applied when applying Chinook that is passed on to technology that would traditionally be done by humans.

As IRCC defines:

The Chinook directly assists an Officer in approving or refusing a case. Indeed, Officers have to apply discretion in refusing, but Chinook presents and automates the process. Furthermore, it has fundamentally reversed the decision-making processing, making it a decide first, justify later approach with the refusal notes generator. Chinook without AI generating the framework, setting up the bulk categories, automating an Officer’s logical reasoning process, simply does not exist.

These systems replace the process of Officer’s  needing to manually review documents and render a final decision, taking notes to file, to justify their decision. It is to be noted that this is still the process at low volume/Global North visa offices where decisions do this and are reflected in the extensive GCMS notes.

In Chinook, any notes taken are hidden and deleted by the system, and a template of bulk refusal reasons auto-populate, replace, and shield the actual factual context of the matter from scrutiny.

Hard to see how this is not AI. Indeed, if you look at the comparables provided – the eTA, Visitor Record and Study Permit Extension automation in GCMS, similar automations with GCMS underpin Chinook. There may be a little more human interaction, but as discussed below – a human monitoring or implementing an AI/advanced analytics/triage system doesn’t remove the AI elements.

 

Human in the Loop is Not the Defining Feature of AI

The defense we have been hearing from IRCC is that there is a human ultimately making a decision, therefore it cannot be AI.

This is obscuring a different concept called human-in-the-loop, which the Policy Playbook suggests actually needs to be part of all automated decision-making processes. If you are following, what this means is the defense of a human is involved (therefore not AI), is actually a key defining requirement IRCC has placed on AI-systems.

It is important to note that there is certainly is a spectrum of application of AI at IRCC that appears to be leaning away from human-in-the-loop. For example, IRCC has disclosed in their Algorithmic Impact Assessment (“AIA”) for the Advanced Analytics Triage of Overseas Temporary Resident Visa (“TRV”) Applications that there is no human in the loop with the automation of Tier 1 approvals. The same system without a human-in-the-loop is done for automating eligibility approvals in the Spouse-in-Canada program, which I will write about shortly.

 

Why the Blurred Line Between Process Automation and Automated Decision-Making Process Should Not Matter – Both Need Oversight and Review

Internally, this is an important distinguishing characteristic for IRCC because it appears that at least internal/behind-the-scenes strategizing and oversight (if that is what the Playbook represents) applies only to automated decision-support systems and not business automations. Presumably such a classification may allow for less need for review and more autonomy by the end user (Visa Officer).

From my perspective, we should focus on the last part of what IRCC states in their playbook – namely that ‘staff should consider whether automation that seems removed from final decisions may inadvertently contribute to an approval or a refusal.’

To recap and conclude, the whole purpose of Chinook is to be able to render the approval and refusal in a quicker and bulk fashion to save Officer’s time. Automation of all functions within Chinook, therefore, contribute to a final decision – and not inadvertently but directly. The very manner in which decisions are made in immigration shifts as a result of the use of Chinook.

Business automation cannot and should not be used as a cover for the ways that what appear routine automations actually affect processing that would have had to be done by humans, providing them the type of data, displaying it on the screen, in a manner that can fetter their discretion and alter the business of old.

That use of computer technology – the creation of Chinook – is 100% definable as the implementation of AI.

 

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Will Tao is an Award-Winning Canadian Immigration and Refugee Lawyer, Writer, and Policy Advisor based in Vancouver. Vancouver Immigration Blog is a public legal resource and social commentary.

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